The revelation that the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had been providing the designs and technology to produce nuclear fuel for nuclear weapons to Iran, North Korea and Libya for the past 15 years highlights the traditional hypocrisy between state ideology and state interests.

Khan, who had made millions of dollars selling information to countries that are part of the Bush administration's "axis of evil," oversaw a network where nuclear hardware was secretly transported on charter planes to destinations in Iran, North Korea and Libya. These three countries have earned the scorn of Washington since each of them has worked counter to U.S. interests in their respective regions.

Furthermore, evidence that some of the nuclear material sent to North Korea appeared to have been flown on government cargo planes raises questions as to how involved President Pervez Musharraf's government in Islamabad was in the nuclear proliferation. Even more concerning, American intelligence officers told the New York Times that Pakistani nuclear transfers to Libya continued through last fall.

In order to shield itself from the blame, Islamabad has placed various nuclear scientists under house arrest, claiming that it has isolated the individuals who had been selling nuclear secrets abroad. Yet the family members of those detained have been speaking up adamantly, arguing that the government was completely complicit in the selling of the secrets.

There have been no calls within the Bush administration to deal forcefully with Khan, who is a national hero in a country that the administration looks at as the key link in the "war on terrorism" and U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the rest of Central and South Asia. Since the plan to invade Afghanistan was drawn up, the Bush administration utilized Pakistan's dictatorial regime in order to help support U.S. interests in the region, giving in return recognition of Musharraf's contested rule.

The Bush administration's tepid response to Khan's actions highlights how a state's national interests often overshadow its state ideology. The fact that Dr. Khan was able to be a principal contributor to nuclear proliferation and not receive a harsh response from the U.S. government shows that the Bush administration wants to keep the controversy about his actions to a minimum so as not to upset President Musharraf's tenuous hold on power. Washington was so lax on its treatment of Khan that the scientist received a full pardon from Musharraf.

If the administration were to harshly condemn Islamabad and Khan for their nuclear proliferation activities, which would have been a response more in line with the traditional Bush administration policy, it would threaten to make Musharraf so unpopular at home that it could create enough instability to remove him from power, an already ominous thought considering the frequent, and fairly sophisticated, assassination attempts on his life.

If the Bush administration were to lose its influence in Pakistan, it would give up a vital foothold in U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Central and South Asia. Furthermore, with Pakistani society already having predominately virulent attitudes toward the U.S., without Musharraf's iron grip on Pakistan's domestic population there would probably be retaliation against U.S. interests, likely in the form of terrorism.

These geostrategic concerns explain why the Bush administration has seemingly diverted from its policy of hard-line treatment toward any state that is involved in the production or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If the administration were to treat each case the same, in what the administration has often called "moral clarity," it would possibly prove disastrous to U.S. interests in the world. In order to secure a country's national needs, it is often necessary for state leaders to ignore their own stated ideology with the intention of protecting their country's national interests.

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